CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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- Until late 1949, personnel in Czechoslavak, Romanian, Bulgarian, and Polish uniforms were the only satellite military personnel seen in the Moscow area. There was even a unit of Yugoslav emigres stationed somewhere in Moscow; these Yugoslavs had remained in Moscow during and after the Tito-Stalin break of 1948, aligning themselves with the USSR.
- 2. Chinese, Korean, and other satellite military personnel studied at the Frunze Military Academy and at the Lenin Political Academy, adjacent to the Moscow Operatta Theater, on Bolshaya Sadova Street in Moscow. Satellite personnel began arriving at the latter Academy in 1947; Yugoslavs began training in that year. Officers from other European satellites began training in 1948. In spring 1950, there was a sudden influx of large numbers of Chinese and some Korean military personnel at this and other academies in the Moscow area.
- 3. The Lenin Academy was under the direction of the Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army.

there were always about 1,000 to 1,500 students present. Only the best officers were selected for these political commissar courses, and the criteria for selection included leadership and excellence in military science as well as high intellectual ability. Ranks ranged from junior lieutenant to major.

4. Sometime between 1948 and 1950, special Chinese support units were established in both the Committee of Information and the MGB. The tasks of these units were to support MGB-Chinese liaison, to assist the Chinese in setting up their own intelligence and security services, and, to a limited extent, to keep an eye on the Chinese Communists. KI and MGB members detailed to China on this assignment wore civilian clothes. It was an accepted fact among members of these groups that, by early 1950, the number of Soviet military assistance personnel in China was "huge".

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5. In addition to those mentioned above, specialists in medicine, industry, and agriculture were sent to China by other ministries

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Soviet military advisors in China operated down through the battalion level. Artillery and armor were the chief arms represented among the Soviet advisors detailed to China. The principal service represented was the medical. Soviet surgical supplies were made available to the Chinese, requiring re-education of the Chinese in Soviet surgical methods. Colonel General Burdenko, as of 1950 the senior surgical officer of the Soviet Army medical service and author of several books (unidentified) on military medicine, may have been instrumental in passing Soviet know-how in field medicine to the Chinese Communist Army. Burdenko gained his experience in field surgery as a senior medical officer under Marshal Konev during World War II.

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Soviet political advisors attached to the Chinese Communist Army, if they were attached, probably extended down to the battalion level.

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